Friday, April 30, 2010

Middle East Peace: So Why Have We Failed?

FP speaks with leading Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians who've tried to bring this decades-long conflict to an end.
MAY/JUNE 2010
Gen. Anthony Zinni

Former head of U.S. Central Command and U.S. envoy to the Middle East peace process in 2001 and 2002

What I learned: By now, we should realize what doesn't work: summits, agreements in principle, special envoys, U.S.-proposed plans, and just about every other part of our approach has failed. So why do we keep repeating it? Michael Oren

Israel's ambassador to the United States; historian of the Middle East

What I learned: Calling this an Arab-Israeli conflict today is largely a misnomer. We have two states that have peace treaties with Israel. The largest antagonist is Iran, which is not an Arab state. But I've been studying the relationship between the United States and Israel for a long time, back since the 1967 war, when it was truly more of an Arab-Israeli conflict, and one thing that has struck me is the depth of the relationship between the United States and Israel. The relationship is truly deeper and more multifaceted than how I understood it in the past.

Who's to blame: I don't think assigning blame is productive, but I think the main obstacle is getting the Palestinian Authority back to the negotiating table. It's quite extraordinary: We now have a situation that existed before Oslo in '93 and before Madrid in '91 -- we can't get the Palestinians to sit down face to face with us and discuss the issues.

Out-of-the-box idea: As an ambassador, we don't generally do out-of-the-box ideas. If you ask me what the key to moving forward is, I would say that Palestinians, and Arabs more generally, must feel that they have more to gain by participating in negotiations than not. If they believe that by staying out of negotiations they can win concessions over issues such as East Jerusalem, why would they participate in what can be a drawn-out, uncertain process?



Yossi Beilin

Former Israeli Knesset member and co-author of the 2003 Geneva Accord, a model agreement for a two-state solution

What I learned: There are majorities on both sides that would support any peace treaty, but that was not enough. I did not appreciate the significance of small minorities that were ready to pay a very high price to torpedo any peace process.

Who's to blame: The leadership on both sides that were not courageous enough to get to the moment of truth. On both sides, there was always a feeling that they had room for maneuver: Let's wait for the next American president; let's wait for the next government on the other side. The combination of Yasir Arafat and Benjamin Netanyahu after the assassination of Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin was also very problematic. I believe that had Rabin not been assassinated, we could have had peace by now.



James Wolfensohn

Special envoy for Gaza disengagement during George W. Bush's administration; former World Bank president

What I learned: I first approached the peace process thinking it was solvable -- that if you came up with a reasonable plan, each side would think that it was in their enlightened interest to follow it. I thought rationality would prevail. But to my great sadness, the notion of some perfect peace plan has not emerged. What's desperately needed is an intervention by, frankly, our country and the president. Absent that, I think it's unlikely you're going to see a near-term solution.

Out-of-the-box idea: If the United States were to take a very straightforward and unyielding line, it would help Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he wants to do a deal, and it would certainly help the Arabs come together. But that's certainly not a new idea.

Robert Malley

Special assistant to President Bill Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs from 1998 to 2001

What I learned: There is no such thing as a good idea -- merely ideas that might work at a given time. Palestinians opposed the two-state solution until the late 1980s; after they accepted it, Israel refused the notion of a Palestinian state until the turn of the century. Today, it seems more of an Israeli than a Palestinian priority.

Who's to blame: Americans, Palestinians, and Israelis were all to blame for the failure of the 2000 Camp David talks. That conclusion can fairly be extended to peace efforts as a whole. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have been prepared to fully own up to the fears and needs of the other. As for the United States, it historically has been overly sensitive to Israeli and excessively ignorant of Palestinian politics. It failed to reconcile its multiple and often contradictory roles: as midwife of a putative deal, honest broker, and Israel's closest ally.



Gamal Helal

Chief U.S. interpreter for more than two decades during Arab-Israeli peace negotiations

What I learned: A lot of diplomats consider constructive ambiguity as a viable tool, but I believe there is no such thing as constructive ambiguity -- there is only destructive ambiguity.

Out-of-the-box idea: I would tell the Arabs and Israelis, "I'm not going to need this or want this more than you do." One of the biggest mistakes in U.S. diplomacy is when we look like we want a settlement more than the parties.



Dov Weisglass

Top advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

Who's to blame: The United States and Israel in the last year basically reshuffled the whole arrangement so that everything is back in debate; everything is an issue. That's why the conflict is far more complicated than it used to be four years ago, and even two years ago.

Out-of-the-box idea: I'm not sure it's possible to turn the world backward. But if it's possible, I would tell today's leaders to stick to the Roadmap. There will never be a final solution to the conflict here if there is no security. The Palestinian government under Salam Fayyad has made a dramatic improvement in the way they are acting against terrorism. It's not 100 percent, but relative to what it was five years ago, there's no comparison. One part of the doubt, the hesitation -- even the resentment -- toward the Roadmap was the view that this sequentiality of security, then politics is impractical: The Palestinians will never meet those obligations. What's happening now shows that if they want to, they can.

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